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Bhambra and Azmanova: Decolonizing the Western Mind

On Imperialism’s Afterlife

Albena Azmanova: The five centuries during which humankind lived in the shadow
of the West were officially over with the dismantling of colonialism in the second half
of the twentieth century. The U.S. failure in Vietnam and more recently in
Afghanistan, and the rise of China as a superpower have displayed the futility of
Western powers’ aspirations to impose their order on the world. Yet, the issue of the
pervasive and persistent impact of Western imperialism keeps reemerging. The
insidious legacy of empire endures via the permeation of Western worldviews in the
former colonies, the perpetuation of racial injustice even after decades of antidiscrimination struggles, and the structuring of the global economy of knowledge
around epistemic inequalities and dominations moulded by colonialism. Putin’s
invasion in Ukraine in February 2022 and the justification of that aggression with a
narrative about sovereignty and emancipation (e.g., defense of Russian territorial
sovereignty and claims of liberating the purportedly oppressed Ukrainian population)
is but the latest symptom of the tenacity of Western imperialistic common sense. It is
high time to decolonize the Western mind. Your writing has been at the forefront of
calls for a radical decolonizing not only of politics, but also of practices of knowledgecreation and learning. Let me open this conversation by trying to articulate the
radicalism of your position in the following way:
The role of colonialism in the development of modern society is by now well
acknowledged. We have long known that colonialism and slavery fuelled the
development of European economies – there is no Manchester without the
Mississippi and Mumbai. But in a number of works, most recently, in the book
Colonialism and Modern Social Theory (Polity 2021), which you co-authored with
John Holmwood, you have extended the thesis of the colonial constitution of
modernity to the “colonial constitution of social science”. You have argued not only
that the injustices of the past have continued into the present and are in need of
repair (and reparation), as many thinkers within the de-colonial and post-colonial
movement have urged, but that this reparative work must also be extended to the
disciplinary structures of the social sciences themselves. Yours is therefore a more
radical claim: you argue that to rethink modernity, we need to rethink social science
and transform the sociological imagination. This is the case because social science,
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as it developed in parallel with the historical practices of imperial expansion and
oppression, not only served and justified that expansion, but was constituted by that
oppression and thus has remained constitutively marked by it. In other words,
colonialism has so deeply affected social science that we don’t even have the
conceptual tools of performing the emancipatory critique to which we, social
scientists, are committed. And hence you urge a thorough transformation of social
science, which is, of course, more ambitious than simply adding in the missing
elements.

Gurminder K. Bhambra: The key issue that I am concerned with in my work is the
systematic failure to take colonial histories into account in our understandings of the
social sciences. Colonialism did not happen just as something parallel to the
development of modernity, it was integral to it. So, if modernity is seen to be
foundational for the social sciences – that they are both a product of modernity and
articulate modernity’s self-understanding – then colonial processes also have to be
addressed. What is missing in dominant accounts, then, is a proper consideration of
the world-historical processes of dispossession, appropriation, elimination,
extraction, enslavement, and indenture which colonialism represents and how they
are central to the emergence and development of modernity and what social science
takes to be its distinctive institutional forms. The failure to take into account the
connected histories of colonialism and modernity that produce our shared present
leads to our inability to effectively address social and political problems in the
present.
I propose that the standard understandings of social science can be criticized
both substantively and in terms of their epistemological claims. The substantive
issues, as just mentioned, are that the historical record is different to that found
within most sociological and social scientific understandings. Recent arguments
have drawn attention to two key deficiencies within these narratives. First, that the
endogenous processes deemed significant in understanding the key events of
modernity had broader conditions of emergence and development. Second, that
other global processes usually not addressed by sociology, specifically colonial
processes, are also central to the development of modernity, but are elided in
sociology’s conceptual framing of it. In terms of epistemology, it is important to note
that sociology is both a system of knowledge oriented to history and is constituted by
https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/emancipations/vol1/iss2/6
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that history. In this way, the displacement of colonial structures from accounts of
modernity means that sociological thought is unreflectingly colonial in how it has
been formed and developed. This is the key object of my analysis.
Social Science’s Crimes and Misdemeanors

Albena Azmanova: Before we address the specific deficiencies of social science
that need to be remedied, let us first clarify the object of your critique: social science.
Even if we reduce it to its most narrow scope, as 'social theory', social science is a
diverse entity: it extends from Weber’s account of the various legitimation resources
of power to Foucault’s analysis of biopolitics; from rational-choice theory that still
permeates neoclassical economics to value-centered social constructivism that has
gained popularity of late. How do you establish the common denominator that allows
you to articulate a distinct object that is in need of transformation?

Gurminder K. Bhambra: We have come to think of the social sciences as an
aggregation of discrete and mutually inconsistent undertakings, both in the relation
between disciplines (say, economics and sociology) or within disciplines (in the
different approaches within sociology, for example). While there are many
differences expressed within the social sciences, there are two things that they all
share. They share an absence – that is, any address of colonial history – and they
also share a common focus on modernity, where this absence is most pertinent.
Sociology is a specific and separate discipline, but it also represents itself as
organizing the relations between disciplines. Its emergence, as Habermas has set
out, should be understood in the context of economics and politics establishing
themselves as specialized sciences and, as a consequence, leaving sociology with
the residue of problems that were no longer of concern to them. This disciplinary
construction separates the sphere of the rational (system) – that is, economics, with
its object being the market; and politics, with its object being administration and
strategic action (or bureaucracy) – from the sphere of the non-rational (social). In this
perspective, sociology emerges as a particular form of reflection upon the sphere of
the ‘system’, how it impinges on the social and, in turn, how it is impinged upon by
the social; in other words, as Habermas put it, sociology is expressed in a theory of
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action which encompasses the dimensions of system and social integration, while its
specific object is social integration.
This framing is commonly accepted and the key issue I would draw attention
to is that the social is understood in terms of a theory of the ‘modern’ social. It is the
modern social without recognition of colonialism as also integral to its constitution –
colonialism is neither part of the ‘system’ nor of the ‘lifeworld’, and the analytical
categories are presented in terms of processes of capitalism and community
endogenous to Europe. To the extent that colonialism is taken into account within the
social sciences it is likely to be within the discipline of anthropology whose domain is
seen to be that of the traditional and pre-modern, not the modern. While the dividing
line between the social sciences is their orientation to modernity (politics, economics,
sociology) or tradition (anthropology), what connects them, through its absence, is
colonialism.
There is, then, an alternative colonial frame within which we can come to
understand that the making of societies as modern or as traditional is produced out
of colonial relationships. The failure to acknowledge these connections is the
common absence amongst the social sciences and what is needed is an address of
the modern not in terms of the modern-traditional divide, but to think about how the
modern comes to be in terms of understandings of it as ‘colonial-modern’.

Albena Azmanova: How should we therefore understand more specifically the
endemic deficiency of social science? In what way have colonial practices been
omitted from social science? We surely know about slavery because colonial
practices have been recorded and studied. Moreover, you claim that colonial
histories have not only been omitted as a subject-matter (so, there is a lack), but that
this omission has affected our very understandings of the social sciences – so there
is a deeper effect of that omission, an affliction in the wiring of the Western mind.
This is an extremely interesting proposition. So, what is this deeper deficiency in the
social sciences and how would our understanding of social sciences change if we to
develop a proper understanding of the ‘colonial-modern’?

Gurminder K. Bhambra: Histories of colonialism and slavery exist. These histories
tend to be associated, by social scientists, with activities that are not seen to be
significant to how we understand the modern world. Properly acknowledging the
https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/emancipations/vol1/iss2/6
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significance of these histories within contemporary social science would requires us
to reconstruct the dominant paradigms that had been established without taking
them into account. They should cause us to rethink our accepted frameworks of
explanation which had been established on the basis of narrower histories. The facts
and interpretations that support standard ideas of European modernity, for example,
are countered by a growing body of literature that presents alternative interpretations
and contestations of those ‘facts’. The weight of such arguments is sufficient to
suggest that an alternative to the grand narrative of ‘European modernity’ is both
plausible and likely to be productive of new insights. The task that postcolonial
criticism asks us to consider is to rethink modernity in the context of this new data
and develop paradigms adequate for a global age in which the global is now
understood as the condition of the modern world, not its consequence.
For example, social, political, and economic changes associated, variously,
with the Renaissance and the French and industrial revolutions are argued to have
brought a new modern world into being, one that was marked by two forms of
‘rupture’. The first is a temporal rupture dividing a traditional rural past from a modern
industrial present. The second is a spatial disjuncture that located change in Europe
(later to be widened to the category of the West more generally) from the rest of the
world. Taken together, key events associated with modernity are framed within a
particular narrative of European history understood in narrowly bounded terms.
There is little acknowledgement of their situatedness within broader connections.
When discussing the Industrial Revolution, for example, most people suggest
that it begins in Europe, in Britain, and even more specifically, in the cotton mills of
Manchester and Lancaster. However, cotton isn’t a plant that is native to Europe let
alone to Britain. It comes from India as does the technology of how to dye and
weave it. The raw material is grown in the Southern states of the US by Africans who
have been taken there as part of the European trade in human beings. The raw
material is shipped to Manchester where it's turned into cloth and that cloth is sold
around the world, usually at the point of a gun because it is of inferior quality to
cotton produced elsewhere.
As such, there were already global connections that enabled Manchester to
come to be seen as the origin of the Industrial Revolution. Yet if we start from
Manchester, we efface these existing relationships. We imagine industrialization
happening spontaneously within Europe and then creating capitalist global relations
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in its spread outwards when actually there are colonial global relations that underpin
the very possibility of the emergence of industrialization and then capitalism. Why
this matters, is because of the ways in which we understand global inequality in the
present. Differences between regions are often naturalized and poverty elsewhere is
presented as a consequence of internal deficiencies as opposed to emerging as a
consequence of colonial processes. This leads to solutions to poverty being posited
in terms of arguments for development or aid or charity, as opposed to thinking
through the necessity of global redistribution and reparations as a more appropriate
way to redress such issues. The wealth of Europe has been established on the basis
of illegitimate colonial processes; justice in the present requires us to take these
historical processes into account when thinking through how best to address global
inequalities.

Albena Azmanova: You remarked that, when discussing the industrial revolution,
most people think it begins in Britain -- I wonder whose ignorance is at stake here. I
doubt that most people would be able to place Manchester on a map, but surely
most historians acknowledge the history of Manchester’s cotton mills. Social science
has studied the colonial enablers of European industrialization for years. In fact,
there is such a disconnect between academia and the opinions of the average
taxpayer that ‘liberal’ higher education is blamed by the far right for our governments’
wasting taxpayer money on welcoming ‘undeserving immigrants’ that are seen as
strangers invading ‘our land’. Whose thinking do you have in mind when you speak
of most people’s flawed or deficient knowledge of colonialism?

Gurminder K. Bhambra: As I’ve said, my concern is primarily with the failure of
social scientists to adequately reckon with the shared histories that have produced
our modern world. It is simply incorrect to say that the standard works of social
science – those works which form its concepts and the curricula that are taught –
address the colonial contexts of industrialization or adequately reckon with the
histories of chattel slavery in the construction of the modern world. These issues, for
example, are not discussed in Giddens’ Capitalism and Modern Social Theory nor in
Nisbet’s The Sociological Tradition nor in Münch’s two volume Sociological Theory.
Colonialism and chattel slavery form no part of the discussions of the more recent
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formulation of ‘multiple modernities’ either. Moreover, the political engagements of
social scientists are not so different to those of politicians, which is presumably why
academics with erstwhile social democratic sympathies can find themselves referring
to immigrants as ‘invaders’. It is precisely the failure to acknowledge our histories in
common that prepares the ground for the narrow and atavistic politics that we see
dangerously on the rise across Europe.
Albena Azmanova: Would you exempt from this account of social science’s neglect
the work of scholars like Immanuel Wallerstein, for example who builds on Marx’s
notion of primitive accumulation and exploitation in order to give a detailed historical
account of the emergence of the Modern World System through military and cultural
colonization, a process in which the Occidental ‘core’ subjugates the ‘periphery’ in a
perpetual process of abuse of human beings, their societies and their natural
environment? Before him, Marx was well aware of the significance of the
colonization of the Americas, India or China, of the slave economy in the industrial
revolution, and of the role of India in British capitalism (e.g. in The Communist
Manifesto). Similarly, Kari Polanyi writes about the origins of capitalism in the
colonial slave/sugar economy, and David Graeber has covered this territory
exhaustively. And how about thinkers like Rosa Luxemburg and Lenin, for whom
imperialism is a central theme? Georg Lukacs, for instance, has claimed that
irrationality is immanent in fascism, capitalism and imperialism (in his Destruction of
Reason). Moreover, by positioning their analysis within an ontology of social systems
as systems of social relations, such thinkers are not beholden epistemologically to
notions of territorially bound power such as ‘nationhood’ and ‘statehood’. This
attention to the system, to the whole, allows analysis in principle, as a matter of its
basic conceptual framework, to remain open to alternative voices and practices, it
seems to me, exactly in the way you urge social science to be epistemologically
inclusive. Would you argue that these thinkers haven’t gone far enough in their
analysis, or that their work hasn’t adequately penetrated the mainstream of social
science?

Gurminder K. Bhambra: There are absences within the work of individual scholars
that require address, as well as absences that accumulate within the disciplines. The
idea that there is a ‘system’ or conceptual framework that exists as, in principle, able
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to address ‘absences’ which are then deemed to be no more than additional
instantiations is a common assumption within the social sciences. It is something
John Holmwood and I address as one of the fictions of modern social theory, the
idea of a transcendent sociological reason. Of course, the specific nature of what is
argued will vary by author.
For example, as I argued previously in Connected Sociologies, Wallerstein’s
modern world-system can be understood as follows. The long sixteenth century saw
the emergence of a European world-economy that was a system of economic
linkages greater than any juridically-defined political unit. It was distinguished from
empires, which were regarded as political units, and differed from earlier worldeconomies precisely by not being also transformed into empires. While Wallerstein
recognizes that the economic linkages between places were appropriately
understood in the context of the world, he circumscribes the remit of political action
to that of the national state. But the very context for a worldwide division of labour
that included slavery and coerced cash-crop labour, sharecropping, bonded labour,
and free labour was usually an imperial or colonial regime that participated in
enslavement and subjugation beyond its national boundaries. The realm of political
action extended beyond the national state and was constituted in the imperial or
colonial states within which ‘worldwide’ economic differentiation was created and
managed. By distinguishing a world-economy from an ideal type of world-empire,
Wallerstein has little room in his analysis for the very real empires of European
states, or the ‘free-trade imperialism’ they operated, that had worldwide reach.
Where these are discussed, they are discussed in terms of their peripheral relation to
the European world-economy (the Americas) or as external to it (Asia) and the
manner of their ‘incorporation’ is naturalized.
While there is much to be gained from the scholarship of all those you list,
there is also an absence in common – the failure to take actually existing empires
and histories of colonialism seriously in the construction of sociological concepts and
categories that are otherwise established on the basis of the endogenous histories of
Europe.
Albena Azmanova: I’d like to probe further your thesis that sociological thought is
unreflexively colonial because the making of societies as modern or as traditional is
produced out of colonial relationships. The status of colonial practices within social
https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/emancipations/vol1/iss2/6
DOI: https://doi.org/10.54718/LBEI1350

8

Bhambra and Azmanova: Decolonizing the Western Mind

science could be understood in two ways. If these practices have been enabling
conditions for the development of modernity, they have indeed made an important
causal impact, but they remain just that -- enabling conditions. In such a case, there
is no logical reason to see them also as constitutive elements of modernity – that is,
elements in the very structure of modernity that define its character. (Insemination as
a cause for the creation of a child, but semen is not as a constitutive element of the
child.) Under the first option (of a causal link between colonialism and modernity)
colonial practices allow the social sciences to be used for nefarious political goals,
for instance in eugenics, but are not indispensable to the functioning of modernity.
Under the second option, colonial practices are constitutive of knowledge, have
shaped social theory and pervaded its existence. You seem to be making both
claims. Can you clarify the second one? How is colonialism, in your view, not just an
enabling condition but also an element in the very constitution of modern social
science? And what is the specific fallacy this entails – how is social science
epistemically deficient?

Gurminder K. Bhambra: The significance of colonialism to the constitution of the
social sciences can be considered from two perspectives. One is their adequacy in
the light of what they purport to describe. Second is the implication of a different
understanding of their significance for the categories that theorists have sought to
separate from those histories.
In terms of the first kind of misrepresentation, we see that in early modern
social theory, in addressing the issue of the rights of property, a God-given commons
is seen to be available to be brought into possession through the use of one’s labour
(including the labour of one’s servants). This theory, that CB Macpherson called the
theory of possessive individualism, is most usually seen as the precursor to a
capitalist mentality. However, it is clear that, in the writings of Hobbes and Locke, for
example, it arises in the immediate context of encounters with others in the lands
that come to be known as the Americas. This clearly is a colonial context and not
only Hobbes and Locke but also others at the time were participants in the
corporations that took land and other people into possession. The misrepresentation
involves also denying the practices of agriculture and husbandry of those others
encountered on the lands being taken into possession. This is necessary to deny
that they have established claims over those lands through their labour. Equally, in
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other writings, the resistance to incursions is treated as a sign of barbarism that
warrants being taken into possession. Enslavement is not then perceived as a
barbaric practice enacted by Europeans, but as a condition suited to ‘barbarians’ by
which they might be improved and readied for a modernity defined separately of
such processes.
This then moves to the second form of misrepresentation. Here, we begin to
see others depicted in terms of stages of history. That is, the colonial practices of
Europeans are presented as enacted upon populations at different stages in history
which are destined to disappear in the course of progress. This construction not only
makes other peoples disappear, it also renders invisible the continuity of the
practices that establish a modern world theorized independently of them. In
addressing what scholars at the time did write about colonialism and bringing it into
the focus of attention, in Colonialism and Modern Social Theory Holmwood and I
seek to show how a proper accounting of colonialism and empire would disrupt the
integrity of the categories they otherwise promote and open up new ways of thinking
about modern social thought. The issue now, however, is not simply to add
colonialism to sociology’s repertoire of topics, but to show how that repertoire has
been structured by the absence of its consideration and must be fundamentally
transformed.

Albena Azmanova: It is true that virtually all of the early leading political thinkers
and theorists of liberal democracy (Tocqueville, J. S. Mill, M. Weber) were not only
Eurocentric, not just failed to address the injustices of imperialism, but were also
ardent and unscrupulous advocates of colonialism and (“social”) imperialism. And
yet, what should we make of the strands of reflexive critique of science that have
been developed within Occidental social thought? We do not even have to go as far
as critical theory, for instance, the critique of instrumental rationality developed within
the Frankfurt School. We can remain with the pantheon of the founders of social
science and take Max Weber as an example. One can hardly find a harsher criticism
of occidental reason than Weber’s discussion of the irrationality of increased
rationalization in modern Western societies. This criticism is clearly contained in his
thesis that the disenchantment that Modernity engenders effectively entraps us in
an iron cage of systems based purely on teleological efficiency, rational calculation
and control – this is not something Weber celebrated. He denounced Western
https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/emancipations/vol1/iss2/6
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civilization in no uncertain terms, describing it as a world of “specialists without spirit,
sensualists without heart”; he calls it “a nullity that imagines that it has attained a
level of civilization never before achieved” (in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism). Even more closely relevant to your concerns with modern social theory
is Weber’s lecture ‘Science as a Vocation’, in which he highlights the limits of
scientific knowledge, speaks about the historical nature of knowledge, the
particularity of its insights, its inability to grasp the whole or to establish objectivity,
before coming to the dramatic conclusion that “science is meaningless because it
gives no answer to . . . the only important question ‘What shall we do and how shall
we live?’” Weber states here that the highest aim of science is exploring ‘the devil’s
ways to the end in order to realize his power and his limitations’; realizing these
limitations leads to an ethic of responsibility. How is this position, so unambiguously
critical of occidental social science, still tainted or deficient? You seem to point not
just to the absence of critique and self-reflexivity but to the absence of a certain type
of critique.

Gurminder K. Bhambra: In Colonialism and Modern Social Theory, we were
interested in rethinking the ideas of the classical social theorists by locating them
within the times through which they lived. We were interested in what they had to say
about those times, what they missed out, and what difference that makes to what we
had thought we knew about their scholarship. We were also interested to think about
how subsequent commentators have failed to engage with the limited discussions of
colonialism in their thought.
Weber’s definition of the modern state, for example, as that entity which
secures the legitimate exercise of coercive power within a given territory, is
widespread across the social sciences. His conceptualization of the modern state
was based upon an understanding of the contemporary German state as defined by
its national boundaries. However, the construction of the ‘national’ state was
concurrent with, and indeed constituted by, its associated imperial activities. The
establishment of the German state in 1871, for example, was followed by the
intensification of processes of ‘de-Polonization’ and ‘Germanification’ at the
borderlands of the new state. Further, within 13 years of unification, the German
state had begun the process of acquiring the fourth largest colonial empire at the
time.
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The state, as standardly defined, then, did not simply lay claim to a monopoly of the
legitimate use of violence within a given (national) territory, but extended that
violence into other territories and in support of non-state actors (such as trading
companies and the appropriations of settlers) and their property rights. What we
commonly understand as the nation – and as the concept of the nation bequeathed
to the social sciences by Weber – was actually an imperial state, not a national one.
While Weber elides the concept of the nation with imperial power, what enables the
concept to gain traction in its own terms is the omission of German imperialism from
what are presented as ‘national’ histories.
Our argument in the book is that this exercise of violence upon ‘others’
matters in its own terms and in terms of how it requires us to rethink central concepts
within the social sciences such as political legitimacy and accountability. In this way,
what is at stake here is the conceptual architecture that has been bequeathed to us
through particular thinkers.

Albena Azmanova: Let me counter this with the following observation. Granted,
Weber’s thinking about the modern state is likely to have been informed by his
knowledge of the contemporary German state as defined by its national boundaries.
And yet, the conceptual apparatus developed by Weber, namely, the distinction
between legality and legitimacy, between power as the capacity to achieve a
purpose, on the one hand, and on the other, the legitimacy of public authority as
being rooted in the moral beliefs of the political community over which power is
exercised (ergo, his taxonomy of forms of authority in reference to various sources
of legitimacy), his account of public authority as the capacity of a regime to
command the allegiance and support of the subjects of power– all this enables us to
condemn colonialism precisely as a matter of illegitimate use of force – because it is
illegitimate in the eyes of the subjected populations. Doesn’t this show that concepts
developed in a particular era with particular biases are not shackled to the past, and
are therefore not necessarily deficient because they come from a historically bigoted
time? In what sense is this conceptualization of legitimate power (which in Weber’s
account is not conceptually confined to Western statehood or even to modern
sovereignty) deficient in the sense you claim? A still more clear example is the notion
of liberty developed in the 18th century. America was founded by a group of
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slaveowners that claimed all men to be created equal and free. This doesn’t make
“freedom” deficient or unable to transcend its time, or does it?

Gurminder K. Bhambra: This returns us to the issue of the idea of a conceptual
system that transcends the particularities of its use. For example, Weber is not only
the author of a set of analytical categories that purport, as you suggest, not to be
context dependent, but also the author of the methodological justification of that
position. Significantly, within Weber, the conceptual system has less the character of
a system than of an aggregation of ‘types’. Once these ‘types’ are examined, as we
do in Colonialism and Modern Social Theory, we see that what is organized within
each type is mutually contradictory. Each type is argued to be coherent in itself, but
no relations among types can be specified, only their ‘empirical’ combinations. The
fact that the types can only occur empirically in combination suggests the inability to
provide a theoretical specification of their relations, which is a serious limit on
Weber’s theories. For example, how would one address issues of legitimacy and
legality in a divided political community, such as is a feature of empire, except by
taking the point of view of the dominant group? This is what Weber does and we do
not think it is a failure on his part to understand the implications of his methodology,
but its necessary consequence.

Is Critical Theory a Culprit?
Albena Azmanova: Frankfurt School critical theory’s explicit commitment to
emancipation, together with its ambivalence towards modern conceptions of
progress make it the ultimate test to the claim that social science, as it stands today,
lacks the conceptual resources needed for a critique of modernity. So, let’s come
back to critical theory. I would argue that this particular strand of social theory,
developed effectively within Occidental social science, has in fact accomplished the
radical reconceptualization of social critique you advocate, in the following way.
First, a cornerstone of this tradition is the dialectical approach to the heritage of the
Enlightenment (the wellspring of modern social theory) that Horkheimer and Adorno
developed – calling attention to its nefarious impulses (very much like Weber, in fact)
– in the “Dialectic of Enlightenment” where they unambiguously reject a progressist
reading of modernity. Walter Benjamin comes even closer to your project with his
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verdict that "every document of civilization is also a document of barbarism" and his
notion of the debt we owe to those gone (in his “Theses on the Philosophy of
History.”) In terms of the epistemic foundations of social science, I cannot think of a
more radical stance than the position that any theory – no matter how pluralist it
claims to be – is potentially oppressive in the closures it imposes (someone will
always be left out of any distinct model no matter how complex and pluralist it is). To
be consistently pluralist, one needs to be a pluralist all the way down, and reject
theory altogether. This is what Adorno in fact did, under the impact of Kant's Critique
of Judgment – he gave up theory but not critique, no longer arguing for a critical
'theory' but for a way to critique the social order (e.g. in his Aesthetic Theory). This is
currently the stance of many of us working in the Frankfurt School tradition.
Shouldn’t this distinction between critical theory and social critique be enough to
allow for emancipation without foreclosure, without the epistemic oppression of
closure and exclusion (as even a theory that is ‘enriched’ with missing perspectives
would invariably be). I wonder in what sense this might still be deemed insufficient to
deliver the kind of analysis you advocate?
Gurminder K. Bhambra: Critical theory’s insufficiency rests on the fact that it
doesn’t seem to be able to break out of its own modernist presumptions; that is, it
understands emancipation as associated with modernity. Whether one regards
modernity as a finished project, in terms of an end of history thesis, or as an
unfinished project, as with Habermas, in both cases it is understood separately from
colonialism. If we understand the modern world to indicate empirical historical
progress, we must take into account the horrors that were associated with it.
Otherwise, it's as if we're saying that emancipation can be for us, here in the West,
without us having to take into account the fact that the very possibility of our lives
has been enabled through the subjugation and oppression of others.
Progress in and for Europe came at the cost of the lives and livelihoods of
others. Not to engage with the entanglement of the histories that have produced
modernity is to give up any authority to speak of the universal. This is why I suggest
that it is the belief in historical progress that very precisely means that Frankfurt
School critical theory can make no progress on this topic. I find remarkable the idea
that empirical historical progress can be said to have occurred, and emancipation
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and freedom be possible, without any consideration of the debasement of humanity
that occurred through processes of colonization, enslavement, and indenture.

Albena Azmanova: One of the conceptual cornerstones of the Frankfurt School, its
trade-mark, so to speak, is the understanding that modernity is not marked by an
empirical historical progress. The Angel of History, writes Walter Benjamin, faces
backwards; “Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe
which keeps piling wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet.” (“Theses on the
Philosophy of History”). Indeed, the Frankfurt School authors from the 30s to the 50s
did not address colonialism, but at the time they were preoccupied with a painful
puzzle: Why is it that the disasters of fascism, authoritarianism, war and genocidal
racism did not meet with effective resistance? Confronting these specific forms of
historical evil allowed them to develop a methodology to address all social evils,
including that of colonialism. As to the modernist presumptions: indeed, they are
strongly present in Habermas’ version of critical theory, but have been openly
rejected by other core authors of that tradition. In the first chapter of The Dialectic of
Enlightenment (in discussing Odysseus) Horkheimer and Adorno make the point -that time is circular, hence rejecting the progressive theory of temporality that
underlies modernity. In Aesthetic Theory, Adorno posits that that critique, not being
based on a concept (an epistemological object) is freed from its association with a
theory of modernity. In other words, critique is not based on the logic of
modernization. This position is adopted by most critical theorists nowadays. We don’t
need to endorse Habermas' very particular conception of the tasks of critical theory,
nor his philosophy of history, to perform a historically textured and sociologically
informed critique of injustice within the Frankfurt School tradition – and my recent
Capitalism on Edge aligns in this regard with James Ingram’s World Crisis and
Underdevelopment (in which he addresses the pervasive effect of colonialism),
Andrew Feenberg’s Technosystem: The Social Life of Reason, Gerard Delanty’s
Critical Theory and Social Transformation, and Maria-Pia Lara’s Beyond the Public
Sphere: Film and the Feminist, Imaginary, to mention just a few recent works. And
finally, if the whole issue is about a theory of time, i.e., modernity, what temporal
framework does the de-colonial project work out of? If it focuses on emancipation, is
it not within an evolutionary framework?
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Gurminder K. Bhambra: This again illustrates the point that I am making – issues
of colonialism and empire are rendered as ‘empirical’ and, as such, should not be
allowed to call the analytic categories into question. However, the analytical
categories must have some empirical instantiations, so the question to ask is why
some instances are more important or emblematic than others.
Modernity tends to be understood in terms of historical progress, even if that
progress constitutes an “unfinished project” and one which continually raises new
questions concerning issues of domination and emancipation. The ruptural break
seen to be established by modernity—the break that enables Europe to be
understood in its own terms without having to take the rest of the world into
account—frames the possibilities for the self-understandings of Frankfurt School
critical theory and presents an insurmountable problem from the perspective of
postcolonial and decolonial theories. These latter theories are based on an
understanding of modernity as constituted by coloniality such that modernity does
not emerge from separation or rupture, but through the connected and entangled
histories of European colonization. This immediately complicates the understanding
of historical progress which otherwise provides the ground for much critical theory.
Rather than ‘emancipation’, my concern is repair and reparation.

Albena Azmanova: Shall I then understand that you do not dispute the dialectical
view of the Enlightenment articulated by the first generation of Frankfurt School
authors (who were openly sceptical of historical progress in the face of the Nazi
atrocities), but only Habermas’ felicitous take on modernity as implying progress, be
it unfinished – along the lines of Amy Allen’s criticism in her The End of Progress?

Gurminder K. Bhambra: No, the very idea of constructing the Enlightenment in this
way means that the first generation are rightly confronted by one of the horrors it
contains – the Holocaust. This took place decades after others were also the objects
of disastrous mistreatment in the name of Enlightenment. It is to the credit of
Horkheimer and Adorno that they grapple with this contradiction and we need to
broaden the frame to bring the colonialism with which it is bound up into the analysis.
Habermas does not follow their lead, but it would be mistaken to think that they
themselves provided sufficient ground for the critique that is necessary.
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Recasting the Social Sciences

Albena Azmanova: Apart from the call for systematically acknowledging the impact
of colonial histories, you also seek an epistemological solution to the problem by
suggesting that we build a kind of theory that will incorporate colonialism. If we
undertake the transformation you suggest, what would ensue in substantive
theoretical terms, how would we think about critique differently? What would, for
instance, Weber say about modernity if he paid proper attention to colonialism and
international inequalities?

Gurminder K. Bhambra: Of course, intervention into the nature of conceptual
frameworks and how they construct the field necessarily raises epistemological
questions – and these are not questions I shy away from. However, my primary
interest in sociology and social theory is not epistemological, but substantive. It’s not
so much a question for me of moving from the epistemological to the substantive, but
understanding how one’s substantive engagements require a sorting out of
epistemological questions. In short, I’m a social theorist in that sense by necessity
and my concerns revolve around my interest in the problems of the present. I’m
interested in questions of injustice and inequality in the present and my concern is
how best we can mobilize the resources of the social sciences to enable us to
intervene more effectively in the address of these problems. In that context, one of
the key problems that we have been confronting within Europe, for example, has
been the crisis for refugees that has occurred over the last few years. One of the
ways in which this discourse has been set out, including by well-known social
scientists, is to regard such people as ‘invaders’ who are unfairly and illegitimately
accessing the patrimony of the national state.
However, my argument is that if we understand European states not as
having been nations but for the most part as having been empires or involved in
colonial projects, then we would understand that the wealth of Europe has not been
created endogenously through the labour of Europeans. Rather it has also been
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produced through the appropriation of colonial wealth, of the taxation of colonial
subjects, the extraction of their labour and resources. As such, it is not a national
patrimony that European states have, it is a colonial patrimony. If we were to
recognize it as a colonial patrimony, then maybe that could open up different ways
for us to think about what we might owe others.
This is particularly the case when we have, more often than not, been
responsible for creating the conditions that have necessitated their movements,
whether through war, famine, or climate change and so on. We could think about our
responsibilities differently if we were to acknowledge that the state that we are in has
not historically been a national state, it's been an imperial state. This is true even for
countries in Scandinavia and Eastern Europe who often wish to disassociate
themselves from the idea of a European colonial past by suggesting that they did not
have empires. While they may not have had empires, they certainly participated in
‘emigrationist colonialism’; that is, their populations were part of the processes of
dispossession and settlement of the lands that we now call the Americas, Australia,
New Zealand, South Africa. The wealth they generated in these processes was also
sent ‘back home’ to help support and develop local economies in Europe.
Taking colonialism seriously would transform how we understand the state,
the colonial nature of what is presented as its national patrimony, and questions of
legitimacy and belonging in the present.
Albena Azmanova: But doesn’t this very appeal to acknowledge that the state has
always been an imperial state, as you put it, in fact reproduce thinking of power and
responsibility as being confined to the territorial range of power’s empirical
application? Isn’t that a rather narrow way of thinking about justice and power, tied to
notions of territorial sovereignty? And isn’t therefore Enlightenment’s all-inclusive
humanism a more reliable ground for addressing injustice than any territoriallyconfined notion of repairing specific past injustices? For instance, written in the
1760s when colonialism was just getting going on its largest push for world
dominion, Denis Diderot's “Supplement to the Voyage of Bougainville” is an ardent
anti-colonial satire whose humanism defies the facile opposition between virtuous
nature, represented by Tahiti, and corrupt civilization, represented by Europe. In this
way it offers a critique of injustice that is not tied up with any territorially-bound
affinities. Significantly, the pamphlet was published not by Diderot who knew it would
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get him jailed, but after his death by a right-wing Abbe seeking to show the
degeneracy of the Enlightenment!

Gurminder K. Bhambra: I guess for me, the answer is straightforward. Why must
the places that have been subject to voyages of depredation rely on the ‘superior’
traditions of those from where those voyages issued? If you are saying that there are
critical traditions within Europe, that is easy to accept. But you seem to be implying
that those subject to European power must be grateful for the generosity that is
contained within the tradition notwithstanding that power always trumps it.
Albena Azmanova: My point is quite different – it doesn’t have to do with gratitude
but with ‘right to use’, with range of validity. Those who have been subjected to
European power should be free to make their claims to justice in the terms they
deem comprehensible and on terms they deem fair. What is the reason, however, to
exclude from that repertoire of forms of thought those parts of the intellectual
heritage of the Enlightenment that are critical and emancipatory? What would be the
downside of the subjugated populations’ adopting these strands of the Western
humanistic tradition for their own causes of emancipation, repair and reparation?
This need not be the only available or obligatory option, but why discard it
altogether? The validity and performability of ideas is surely not determined by the
origin or the pedigree of those ideas. In other words, can’t we separate intellectual
validity and usefulness from geographical genesis?

Gurminder K. Bhambra: It is a standard Western idea that knowledge has a history,
but also, at the same time, that ‘our’ knowledge transcends its history. As scholars
such as Anthony Bogues and Robin Celikates have set out, it is an interesting
argument that suggests that emancipation and freedom are possible without having
to take into account the debasement of humanity that occurred while practicing
coercive power over people who had been colonized and enslaved.
The parallels with gender justice should be self-evident here. Patriarchal
practices are not overcome by the inclusion of women under the sign of masculinity.
Why should we not expect the same of coloniality except that it is constructed as
being in and of the past and not part of the social structures of the modern present?
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Our failure to understand the extent to which colonialism structures the modern
means that we expect to find solutions to problems within the language of modernity,
which is actually the language of coloniality. This has not and will not be sufficient.

Albena Azmanova: Indeed, we should not fall into the trap of what I have named
‘the paradox of emancipation’: as we fight for inclusion and equality, we tend to
increase the value of the otherwise unjust system within which we seek equal
inclusion.
It is high time to decolonize the Western mind, but this is also the time to think
how this endeavor could go wrong. The Enlightenment stumbled over its own hubris:
as Marx observed, the normative liberalism of abstract humanism declared that a
level-playing field existed where in fact power asymmetries enabled oppression. That
is why he urged that what matters, instead, is people’s ‘social humanity’ or ‘human
sociality’ (he uses both terms in his Thesis on Feuerbach) – social science should
focus therefore on the concrete social practices through which human togetherness
is enacted, rather than on abstract, totalizing generalizations.
What are the possible pitfalls ahead for the decolonizing project? How could it
be derailed? For instance, isn’t it endangered by the tendency to think of the modern
West, as well as ‘the rest’, as compact entities, and also by the inclination to present
the Western mind in uniformly negative terms, while those of the colonized peoples
in uniformly positive terms? Modern Europe doesn’t hold a monopoly on barbarism
nor did it invent it. Slavery, for instance, had been a globally spread practice
millennia before human bondage was included into the global supply chain of
capitalism in the 16th century. Sub-Saharan Africa had long been a source of slaves,
not to the Europeans, but to North African and Middle Eastern kingdoms. The
Ottoman empire sourced its Christian slaves from Eastern Europe. The fact that skin
colour was not a major factor hardly made those practices less barbaric. When the
Portuguese began their lucrative slave trade in 1444, they tapped into an existing
network of slaves, and the Great North African kingdoms acted as middlemen cutting
a piece of the profits. I think it is safe to say that violence and oppression were
integral to all premodern societies, including those of the colonized territories. The
Japanese samurai had a tradition of cleanly hacking through a passer-by to test out
their new sword. Surely cruelty is not only white and European, not only modern; it
has existed and still persists in forms that have nothing to do with European Empire.
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The fact that these take ‘authentic’ local forms is not much of a consolation.
Admittedly, this is a separate trajectory of criticism: we do not need to address the
injustices with which the non-Western world is riddled in order to address the harms
the West has committed. But wouldn’t a more historicist and dialectical take both on
the Western and the non-western world and their interactions advance us more
securely in the pursuit of justice? Focusing on the historical practices of subjugation
and debauchery within the West, by the West, but also outside the West (i.e. erasing
the distinction ‘the West’ vs ‘the rest’ on which both the colonizing and the decolonizing projects are based) —shouldn’t that be the purpose of the critical
enterprise?
Moreover, some fear that questioning the heritage of the Enlightenment now,
especially when the liberal order is waning, this would weaken these invaluable
sources of empowerment that are needed in the struggles for justice around the
world. In other words, should we abandon the idea of freedom because of the
abuses in its name when so many still rely on that very idea to free themselves?

Gurminder K. Bhambra: Decolonization, first and foremost, should be understood
as a political movement for the dismantling of colonialism. While it has more recently
become associated with struggles for reform of teaching curricula and the practices
of knowledge production more broadly, this also has a longer history (for example,
Ngūgī wa Thiong’o’s Decolonizing the Mind). As such, in our use of the term we
would do well to heed Tuck and Yang’s oft-cited caution that ‘decolonization is not a
metaphor’. This is the key pitfall that I see in such conversations.
Further, I do think we need to be careful in how we represent others. I am
happy to agree that the modern West does not have a monopoly on barbarism and
that oppressive practices are found elsewhere. However, we need to be aware that
the representation of others is part of a process of justification of actions towards
them. My concern is with how European self-constructions of emancipation depend
on oppression, not with an argument that only European modernity is oppressive.
Equally, I don’t think anybody required a European conceptualization of freedom in
order to free themselves from oppression. Colonialism has been resisted from its
very beginning and we can see this through events such as the Haitian revolution
and the first war of independence in India (more commonly known as the Indian
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Mutiny). Further, that resistance to colonialism was often used as a way of justifying
further violence against these populations. Resistance to enslavement, for example,
was used by Europeans to justify enslavement. In this way, the European tradition of
Enlightenment actually justifies its own violence through misrecognizing other
people’s commitments to wish to live freely and not be subordinated to Europeans.
As such, there is a lot to be learnt about what freedom means if we look at the
resistance that there has been to European colonialism. What if we were to construct
our narratives of freedom from these other sources? How might we understand
freedom and emancipation then?
Albena Azmanova: Indeed, have these contexts generated a significantly different
notion of freedom than the one fashioned by the European Enlightenment?
Gurminder K. Bhambra: Emancipation emerges as a key theme within European
Enlightenment thought in the Old World at precisely the time that slavery is being
instituted in the New. While the intellectual content of emancipation was contrasted
to the condition of slavery; the concomitant practice of enslavement by Europeans
did not render suspect their political and intellectual pronouncements on the topic.
Articulated notions of freedom existed alongside continued practices of colonial
domination, enslavement of populations, trade in human beings, and a belief that
some had a greater right to be free than others. Freedom, in these terms, while
espoused abstractly as a universal freedom was, in practice, more circumscribed –
its full enjoyment restricted to white, propertied men of some distinction. Subsequent
renditions of ‘universal freedom’ similarly maintain a limited, racialized understanding
of the concept.
Alongside this tradition, however, there has been another tradition which
developed a more expansive understanding of the concept. As Nikhil Pal Singh
argues in Black is a Country, the freedom struggles of African Americans are as old
as the systematic trade in human beings and include histories of ‘resistance, refusal,
revolts, and runaways.’ Where emancipation has usually been understood in terms
of formal equality (whereby the Jim Crow laws enacting a state of ‘separate and
equal’ were regarded as not incompatible with emancipation), African American
conceptions of emancipation emphasized the necessity of broader understandings of
equality underpinning the possibilities of emancipation. Such an expansive account
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has been central to the work of WEB Du Bois, for example, and it is one that has
been little engaged with by theorists of Frankfurt School critical theory in their own
development of such ideas. As such, one of the distinguishing characteristics of
African American conceptions of emancipation was its expanded definition: from the
narrow sense of being a counterfoil to slavery in terms of simple liberation from
enslavement, to being regarded as the necessary condition for the fulfilment of one’s
capacities as a human being. Ultimately, I’m arguing for the need to transform our
understandings which requires us having to learn from others. One of the things that
I find so interesting is the utter resistance to think that Europeans have anything to
learn from anyone else. The commitment is always to finding resources within one's
own tradition. My question in relation to this is: why be so parochial? Why be so
committed to a frame of reference that necessarily has a historical context and yet
be so unwilling to address that context? And why call this unwillingness, reflexivity?
Albena Azmanova: Has really the West been averse to learning from others? The
Europeans and the Americans have been very apt at appropriating, and even
hijacking, non-Western and non-modern thought. Christianity appropriated pagan
mythology (e.g. fashioning the Devil after Dionisius) just as contemporary business is
deploying Buddhism in pursuing profit. The impact of Confucianism, via Physiocracy,
on Adam Smith and from there on the Scottish Enlightenment, is well-known. Some
parts of US constitutional thought were adapted from the Iroquois & Algonquins.
Gurminder K. Bhambra: Appropriation is not learning!
Albena Azmanova: Very true, and this is a crucial point: what constitutes learning?
Appropriation might well be the nemesis of learning: absorbing new elements into
one’s epistemic framework does not necessarily change that framework, it might only
change the connotation of the absorbed elements. Which brings us to the notion of
learning that undergirds your vision of a thorough transformation of social science as
a collaborative project in which all participants are peers, differently situated partners
in a conversation in which no one has a privileged standpoint. How will this project
avoid the fallacy of exclusion, of silencing the weak and privileging the strong that
has haunted the Occidental forms of thought? Who would speak for the complex
Indian society, for instance? What will be the filter of validity, of rightful belonging to
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this inclusive project of mutual learning? We surely do not want to integrate feetbinding or sati into a global humanity’s culture?
Gurminder K. Bhambra: As I wrote in the conclusion to Connected Sociologies,
accounting for the contemporary configuration of the world, and addressing the
inequalities that we find there, requires taking seriously the understandings of
historical processes upon which disciplines are based. The most significant critique
in this respect has emerged through the bodies of work known as postcolonial and
decolonial thought. Both take the historical processes of dispossession and
colonialism as fundamental to the shaping of the world and to the shaping of the
possibilities of knowing the world. As a consequence, understanding the
contemporary configuration of the world requires the dismantling of the disciplinary
divides and of the disciplinary edifices constructed upon those divides. This process
involves undoing hierarchies and provincializing knowledges, but this is not enough if
those knowledges are seen to have been separately constituted and, further, not
themselves constituted through connections. Without reconstruction, the radical
moment, or movement, of deconstruction will always remain illusory. It is necessary
to create conceptual frameworks that would enable us not just to think sociology
(and other social sciences) differently, but also to do it (and them) differently. To
think sociology differently is to take connections as the basis of the histories which
we acknowledge; to do sociology differently is to act on the basis of having
recognized the significance of those connections.
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